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Professor Michele Goodwin’s essay here (and the article from which it came, to be published in full in our 
Winter issue) explicitly identifies the development of American law as a project of cementing racial caste. 
This piece is a call for conversation and asks us all to consider: “How has the failure to acknowledge and 
address the carnage and prurience of America’s racial origin story impacted life today?” For 26 volumes, 
we have attempted to answer that question. In publishing this story in this issue, we are excited to be joined 
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EXCERPT OF LAW AND ANTI-BLACKNESS
Michele Goodwin*
Editor’s Note: this Essay is a brief excerpt from a longer piece which will be 
published in the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Winter 2021 Issue.
During the spring and summer of 2020, as COVID-19 rapidly 
spread throughout the United States, infecting and killing thousands of 
Americans including children,1 the enduring colorline manifested. As of 
this publication, more than 326,000 Americans have died due to the vi-
rus. Those disproportionately harmed in the U.S have been Indigenous, 
Black, and Latinx communities.2 Even while pundits claimed children 
were safe from the virus, Black and Latinx children suffered and died 
horrific deaths.3 The patterns of implicit and explicit racism in medical 
* Michele Goodwin is Chancellor’s Professor of Law & Founding Director, Center 
for Biotechnology & Global Health Policy, at the University of California, Irvine. The 
author is grateful to the editors at the Michigan Journal of Race and Law. ©
1. See Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, ATLANTIC, Aug. 4, 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-
failure/614191/ [https://perma.cc/7CYE-7D92] (discussing that “few countries have 
been as severely hit as the United States, which has just 4 percent of the world’s popula-
tion but a quarter of its confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths.”); AM. ACAD. OF 
PEDIATRICS & CHILDREN’S HOSP. ASS’N, CHILDREN AND COVID-19: STATE DATA 
REPORT (Nov. 12, 2020), https://services.aap.org/en/pages/2019-novel-coronavirus-
covid-19-infections/children-and-covid-19-state-level-data-report/ (sharing data on 
COVID-19 infections in children on a weekly basis).
2. See CDC, Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-
minorities.html [https://perma.cc/Y9PP-N3NS] (last updated July 24, 2020) (finding 
“increasing evidence that some racial and ethnic minority groups are being disproportion-
ately affected by COVID-19.”).
3. See, e.g., William Wan, Coronavirus Kills Far More Hispanic and Black Children than 
White Youths, CDC Study Finds, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/15/covid-deaths-hispanic-black-
children/ (“Of the children and teens killed, 45 percent were Hispanic, 29 Black and 4 
percent American Indian.”); Gabrielle Chung, Florida’s Youngest Coronavirus Victim Identi-
fied as 9-year-old Kimora “Kimmie” Lynum, PEOPLE (July 27, 2020, 6:42 PM), 
https://people.com/health/florida-youngest-coronavirus-victim-identified-as-9-year-old-
girl-with-kimora-kimmie-lynum-no-preexisting-health-issues/ [https://perma.cc/FUJ8-
XYE7] (“Kimora “Kimmie” Lynum [a nine-year-old African American girl] passed away 
from coronavirus complications after she went down for a nap on July 17.” She went to 
the hospital feeling ill and with a 103 fever, but was never tested for coronavirus until af-
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care combined with social determinants in health meant not even the 
children’s youth nor institutions of public health could save them.4 Their 
deaths served as stark reminders of lingering vulnerability and invisibility. 
Taking seriously that COVID-19 has exposed preexisting institutional 
and infrastructural vulnerabilities and inequality in the U.S,5 this Essay 
turns to what stratifies and divides the nation.
That is, in 2020, it also became unquestionably apparent that the 
pandemic was not all that ails the United States. Systemic racism, white 
supremacy, and anti-Blackness crystallized in the murders of Ahmaud 
Aubrey, an unarmed jogger, stalked and killed by Gregory and Travis 
McMichael in a rural Georgia town;6 Breonna Taylor, an essential 
healthcare provider, fatally shot by several Louisville, Kentucky police of-
ficers;7 and George Floyd, lynched in daylight as a Minneapolis, Minne-
sota officer straddled his neck, pressing a knee onto it for nearly nine
minutes as crowds gasped and watched in horror.8 Weeks later, Jacob 
ter her death.); Jasmin Barmore, 5-year-old with Rare Complications Becomes First Michigan 
Child to Die of COVID-19, DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:45 PM), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/04/19/5-year-old-
first-michigan-child-dies-coronavirus/5163094002 [https://perma.cc/K99W-MGED] 
(Skylar Herbert, a five-year-old African American girl, “tested positive for COVID-19 in 
March and later developed a rare form of meningitis and brain swelling.” She passed away 
in April “after spending two weeks on a ventilator.”).
4. See Wan, supra note 3 (highlighting “underlying social disparities that minority 
children are more likely to experience than their White peers: crowded living conditions, 
food and housing insecurity, parents who are essential workers and cannot work from 
home, wealth and education gaps and difficulty accessing health care because of a lack of 
family resources including insurance, child care, transportation or sick leave.”).
5. See CDC, supra note 2 (explaining that “discrimination exists in systems meant to 
protect well-being or health. . . . Discrimination, which includes racism, can lead to 
chronic and toxic stress and shapes social and economic factors that put some people from 
racial and ethnic minority groups at increased risk for COVID-19.”).
6. See Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death of Ahmaud Arbery, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-
shooting-georgia.html (“On Sunday, Feb. 23, shortly after 1 p.m., [Mr. Arbery] was 
killed in a neighborhood a short jog from his home after being confronted by a white 
man and his son.”).
7. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, 
What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html (reporting “[t]he death of 
Breonna Taylor, a Black medical worker who was shot and killed by Louisville police 
officers in March during a botched raid on her apartment . . . .”).
8. See Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley Willis 
& Robin Stein, How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html (“On 
May 25, Minneapolis police officers arrested George Floyd . . . . Seventeen minutes after 
the first squad car arrived at the scene, Mr. Floyd was unconscious and pinned beneath 
three police officers, showing no signs of life.”).
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Blake, an unarmed father, would be shot seven times, in close range 
while his children watched, in Kenosha, Wisconsin.9
What exactly do these fractures reveal about society and law in the
United States? Is there a descriptive story to tell with a normative analog? 
If so, what can we learn from it? Are there lessons for the present to be 
derived from attention to this past? Has the strange promise of a post-
racial United States materialized after the two-term presidency of its first 
Black president, Barack Obama?
The fractures to which this Essay speaks were brought into stark re-
lief in 2020. They revealed unaddressed racial trauma; an American histo-
ry mired in the terrorism of Black people, spanning slavery and post-
reconstruction; and ultimately centuries of unhealed wounds.10 2020 was 
calamitous and chaotic at best, bringing an increasing death toll from 
COVID-19;11 the untimely death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg;12 and 
political turmoil leading to the general election13 and the challenge of the 
9. See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Blake, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-
kenosha.html (“Jacob Blake, a 29-year-old Black man, was left partly paralyzed after a 
white police officer shot him seven times in the back outside an apartment complex in 
Kenosha, Wis., on Aug. 23 . . . . in front of three of Mr. Blake’s children.”).
10. See, e.g., Lillian Comas-Díaz, Gordon Nagayama Hall & Helen A. Neville, Racial 
Trauma: Theory, Research, and Healing: Introduction to the Special Issue, 74 AM. PSYCHOLOG.
1 (2019) (explaining that “[r]acism and ethnoviolence can be life threatening to [People of 
Color and Indigenous individuals], due to their exposure to racial microaggressions, vicar-
ious traumatization, and the invisibility of racial trauma’s historical roots. Cumulative ra-
cial trauma can leave scars for those who are dehumanized.”); Alia E. Dastagir, George 
Floyd Video Adds to Trauma: ‘When Is the Last Time You Saw a White Person Killed Online?’,
USA TODAY (May 29, 2020, 6:40 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2020/05/28/george-floyd-ahmaud-arbery-covid-emotional-toll-hits-black-families
/5270216002/ [https://perma.cc/AC5H-JGSX] (quoting Alisha Moreland-Capuia, exec-
utive director of Oregon Health & Science University’s Avel Gordly Center for Healing: 
“The persistent pandemic is racism. That’s the pandemic. Recent deaths of individuals of 
color and the deleterious impact of COVID-19 on communities of color stems all the 
way from 1776.”).
11. See Joe Murphy & Corky Siemaszko, U.S. Surpasses 250,000 Coronavirus Deaths as 
Virus Mortality Rate Surges, NBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2020, 3:26 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-surpasses-250-000-coronavirus-deaths-
virus-mortality-rate-n1248109 [https://perma.cc/29K3-R8D5].
12. See Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender Equality, Dies 
At 87, NPR (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972
/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-champion-of-gender-equality-dies-at-87 [https://perma.cc
/8BH3-22G4].
13. See, e.g., Quint Forgey, Zach Montellaro & Caitlin Oprysko, Trump Refuses to 
Back Down on Suggestion of Election Delay, POLITICO (July 30, 2020, 7:27 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/30/trump-suggests-delaying-2020-election-
387902 [https://perma.cc/NR8S-GY6M] (reporting that “President Donald Trump . . .
refused to back down from his suggestion earlier in the day that the November general 
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results, including by President Donald Trump, who claimed on social 
media,14 in the news, and through litigation that the 2020 presidential 
election was steeped in fraud and that he rightfully had won.15
2020 revealed strife and racial tensions that manifested in protest in 
the United States, yet it also beckoned for truth, reckoning, and reconcil-
iation. The strange confluence of events in 2020 urges the acknowledg-
ment of an origin story that places slavery, Jim Crow, and contemporary 
racism in proper discussion and contexts alongside the more popular, tra-
ditional American narratives that center revolutionary spirit of white 
Americans who fought against the British to stake a claim for their 
equality and dignity.16 Long divorced from that historical, political, and 
legal discourse is acknowledgment of the purposeful and enduring harms 
cast upon Black Americans to justify the capitalism derived by slavery and 
the post-Reconstruction era scapegoating of the newly “freed.”17 In other 
election be postponed, repeating unsubstantiated predictions of widespread voter fraud 
amid the coronavirus pandemic . . . .”).
14. Daniel Dale, Fact Checking Trump’s Barrage of Lies Over the Weekend, CNN (Nov. 
16, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/16/politics/fact-check-trump-
rigged-election-dominion-georgia-pennsylvania/index.html [https://perma.cc/8GEN-
8LM6] (“‘I WON THE ELECTION!’ President Donald Trump tweeted just before 
midnight on Sunday night. Trump did not win the election. So this was a fitting conclu-
sion to his lie-filled weekend barrage of tweets, in which he continued to invent imagi-
nary evidence in support of his attempt to deny Joe Biden’s victory.”); Amanda Seitz, 
David Klepper & Barbara Ortutay, False Claims of Voting Fraud, Pushed by Trump, Thrive 
Online, AP NEWS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-
biden-donald-trump-politics-media-1bf96bf3910bdcbe0f125958357c8f1a (noting that
“Trump . . . has continued his assault on the U.S. vote in more than 40 Facebook and 
Twitter posts since Election Day.”).
15. See generally, Jake Horton, US Election 2020: What Legal Challenges Remain for 
Trump?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-
54724960 [https://perma.cc/FK94-V5EC] (explaining that “President Trump is continu-
ing to pursue legal challenges to the US election results, despite state electors having for-
mally nominated Joe Biden as the next president.”).
16. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, How the American Revolution Worked Against Blacks, 
Indians and Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11
/books/review/alan-taylor-american-revolutions.html (reviewing American Revolutions: A 
Continental History, 1750-1804 by Alan Taylor: “he aims to desacralize the Revolution, to 
explode popular myths about it and to rip aside the mantle of nobility, dignity and hero-
ism that he believes has too long covered up its sordid and bloody reality . . . . Southern-
ers . . . engaged in the Revolution principally to protect their property in enslaved Afri-
cans.”).
17. See, e.g., CalvinJohn Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug:” The De-
monization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J. HUM.
BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 350, 353-54 (2016) (writing that “[t]he criminalization of Blackness 
allowed for White supremacy to use Black bodies as their scapegoat for all problems, real 
or fictional.”).
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words, there are racialized traumas and terrorism yet to be fully account-
ed for in the stories we tell ourselves.
For example, from a historical perspective, what message must peo-
ple tell themselves to justify the intergenerational kidnapping and traffick-
ing of children, women, and men across international borders and 
throughout the United States? How does a society come to tolerate chil-
dren on the auction block, bid upon as if field animals? What narratives 
must the auctioneers tell to encourage bidders and secure a lucrative offer 
for the traders in human flesh? How do individuals come to justify their 
participation in the cruel enterprise, including enslaving, renting, leasing, 
and selling their own offspring, born from frequent though unacknowl-
edged debasement of enslaved women?
How has the failure to acknowledge and address the carnage and 
prurience of America’s racial origin story impacted life today? What social 
conditioning made possible the separate and unequal society of the 20th
century? A nation marked by white Christians bombing Black Christian 
churches and the homes of Black ministers and clergy? What lives in the 
soul of a nation to justify school segregation? Housing segregation? Voter 
suppression? The heavy iron shackles that controlled the movements of 
enslaved Blacks were replaced in “freedom” by invisible chains and re-
straints that demarcated social and legal hierarchies protected by law. To-
day, what makes possible a police officer’s strangulation of an unarmed 
Black man, while colleagues look on? In short, one hundred and fifty 
years after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the third and fi-
nal of the Reconstruction Amendments,18 the stain and vestiges of slavery 
in the United States remain.
This Essay addresses a thin slice of the American stain. Its value de-
rives from the conversation it attempts to foster related to reckoning, 
reconciliation, and redemption. As the 1930s Federal Writers’ Project at-
tempted to illuminate and make sense of slavery through its Born in Slav-
ery: Slave Narratives From 1936-1938, so too this project seeks to uncover 
and name law’s role in fomenting racial caste. This excerpt, Part I, in-
cluded here, addresses pathos and hate, the creation of race and otherness 
through legislating reproduction—literal and figurative.
18. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 361 (1870) (explaining that the Reconstruction 
Amendments, “were primarily designed to give freedom to persons of the African race, 
prevent their future enslavement, make them citizens, prevent discriminating State legisla-
tion against their rights as freemen, and secure to them the ballot. The generality of the 
language used necessarily extends some of their provisions to all persons of every race and 
color; but, in construing the amendments and giving effect to them, the occasion of their 
adoption and the purposes they were designed to attain should be always borne in 
mind.”).
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Part I: Pathos and Hate: Creating Race and Otherness
In 1903, W.E.B. DuBois published The Souls of Black Folks, re-
counting that the notion of freedom for Black people “was simply un-
thinkable, the maddest of experiments,”19 because Black people were 
classed as “man and ox together.”20 As part of the Southern strategy, 
white men “fought with desperate energy to perpetuate this slavery un-
der which the black masses. . . .had writhed and shivered.”21 The North-
ern allies proved complicated, according to DuBois, as they stood to use 
newly freed Black people as “a club for driving the recalcitrant South 
back into loyalty.”22 DuBois presciently predicted over a century ago that 
the problems of the United States would be the colorline. That is, the 
struggle with its white supremacy, desperate cleave to racial hierarchy, 
and inability to rid itself of caste.
In 1855, a decade prior to the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification 
Frederick Douglass, known as one of the nation’s leading abolitionists 
and an escapee from the bondages of slavery himself, wrote, “Not only is 
slavery on trial, but unfortunately, the enslaved people are also on trial.”23
He explained, “It is alleged, that they are, naturally, inferior; that they 
are so low in the scale of humanity, and so utterly stupid, that they are un-
conscious of their wrongs, and do not apprehend their rights.”24 This 
American racial colorline established the boundaries of citizenship and 
naturalization.
Placed in its proper context, the American commitment and per-
haps addiction to its racial ideology of a caste system25 should be under-
stood as an uninterrupted continuum since the earliest European and later 
U.S. ships arrived on the North American shores, carrying cargo of kid-
napped and trafficked Africans. Isabel Wilkerson now adds to this canon 
of thought on the American caste system in Caste: The Origins of Our Dis-
contents, contributing in popular form to the academic and scholarly ac-
counts race, caste, and enduring hierarchy and white supremacy in the
United States.26
19. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 27 (1903).
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id.
22. Id. See also, W.E.B. DUBOIS, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a 
History of the Part Which Black Folk Played, in THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1860−1880, 128-81 (1956).
23. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM vii (1855).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g. ISABEL WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 115-
17 (2020) (discussing purity versus pollution).
26. Id.
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Racial caste has long been the euphemistic elephant in the room 
and the American dividing line, demarking power, freedom, and self-
governing. To properly undertake the examination of racial caste in the 
United States requires engaging beyond law, reaching to the fields and 
tools of sociology, ethnography, and anthropology to unpack not only 
law’s racial trap undisguised by legislation such as Fugitive Slave Acts or 
myriad cases, but also the lasting—even haunting—social, cultural, and 
rhetorical norms and mores.
Essential to any caste is the establishment of a rank and order among 
the people stratified. In the United States, this took the form of establish-
ing white supremacy through law, whereby whiteness accorded privileges 
and rights not available to Black people, most apparently, but far from 
exclusively freedom and citizenship.27 In several distinct ways, law served 
a vital purpose in creating racial caste and hierarchy. Law undergirded 
and legalized the lucrative enterprise of American chattel slavery. That is, 
laws in the United States set the conditions that kidnapped and trafficked 
human chattel from Africa would never or rarely rise above their legally 
designated, subordinate status.
First, matrilineality designated that all children born of enslaved 
women would by law inherit the status of their mothers. This proved 
important in denying the multiracial offspring of white plantation owners 
independence and freedom. Second, rules of hypodescent, mandated that 
anyone with any African biological heritage would always be legally des-
ignated as Black, and therefore legally inferior. Later, a third legal provi-
sion would provide another guardrail against the infiltration of whiteness 
and the preserving of the racial order through marriage—namely antimis-
cegenation laws. Finally, a fourth, twentieth century legal movement—
eugenics—would protect the racial caste system from white people unfit 
for whiteness.
A.  Matrilineality
First, given widespread sexual predation against enslaved Black 
women,28 the initial laws creating the racial caste system related to matri-
lineality. Sexual violence against Black women and girls was rampant in 
slaveholding families, even if rendered invisible by historians. However, 
researchers of human genetics offer a sobering account. Rapes against 
27. See Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and
Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 929-33 (2019).
28. Steven J. Micheletti, Kasia Bryc, Samantha G. Ancona Esselmann, William A. 
Freyman, Meghan E. Moreno, G. David Poznik, Anjali J. Shastri, 23andMe Research 
Team, Sandra Beleza & Joanna L. Mountain, Genetic Consequences of the Transatlantic Slave 
Trade in the Americas, 107 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 265 (2020).
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Black women by white men were so common in the United States that 
white men “contributed three times more to the modern-day gene pool 
of people of African descent than European women did.”29
Thus, establishing whether the offspring of a white man and en-
slaved Black woman was free or enslaved was a matter of political urgen-
cy and importance—not only as it related to slavery, but also to racial 
caste. Early American law provided unmistakable clarity. In 1662, the 
Virginia Grand Assembly enacted one of its first “slave laws” to settle this 
point. Lawmakers wrote, “Whereas some doubts have arisen whether 
children got by any Englishman upon a Negro woman should be slave or 
free, be it therefore enacted and declared by this present Grand Assem-
bly, that all children born in this country shall be held bond or free only 
according to the condition of the mother.”30
As defined, matrilineality served multiple purposes. It shielded white 
men from legal and financial obligations to their Black offspring. Such 
laws meant that Black children of white fathers could never establish pa-
ternity, freedom, citizenship, and inheritance rights. Such laws exploited 
Black women’s sexual vulnerability to the predations of white men. Slav-
ery perversely incentivized white male slaveholders sexual assaults on 
their enslaved property as Black women lacked rights and could not lay 
claim to their offspring nor spare them from enslavement. Black women 
and their offspring were all considered the property of the persons who
“owned” them.31
B.  Hypodescent
The second means of ordering America’s racial caste system was its 
establishment of hypodescent through the race-delineating “one drop”
rule. Such laws mandated that any African ancestry defined a person as 
“negro” or “colored” (each of these terms signifying those who would 
today be referred to as Black). Like matrilineality, hypodescent aided in 
establishing and furthering Black second-class citizenship under law. Even 
more, hypodescent or one drop codes bolstered another element of the ra-
cial caste system and white supremacy. By law, one could not exit out of 
what was legally a lowly status of Blackness, even after multiple genera-
tions. And these matters were not confined to the dusty archives of the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth centuries.
29. Christine Kenneally, Large DNA Study Traces Violent History of American Slavery,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/science/23andme-
african-ancestry.html.
30. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, Vol. 11, at 170, 260, 266, 270 (Richmond, Va, 1809-23).
31. See, e.g., Gonor v. Gonor, 11 Rob. 526 (La. 1845).
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In 1984, lawyers for Susie Guillory Phipps filed a suit on her behalf 
to change her racial designation of “colored” to “white” on her 
birth certificate.32 Phipps, the 50-year-old great-great-great-great-
granddaughter of an enslaved Black woman and her owner, fit the Loui-
siana classification of Black, which designated Blackness by “any traceable 
amount.”33 This meant that even though Phipps was 1/128th Black, by 
Louisiana law, she was still legally Black. As such, Louisiana classified her 
as “colored,” on her birth certificate.
The state defended its law, claiming that if Ms. Phipps prevailed, 
the state could be overwhelmed with individuals filing similar claims, 
forcing the state to oppose each case and undertake genealogical re-
search.34 Of course, the state could simply have decided not to litigate such 
cases or perform genealogical research on its citizens. Phipps lost her legal battle 
“to have declared unconstitutional a state law classifying as ‘colored’ any-
one with as little as one thirty-second black ancestry.”35
As in the case of Ms. Phipps,36 even African descendants fitting the 
further delineated racial classifications of “mullato,”37 “quadroon,”38 “oc-
toroon” or “hexadecaroons”39 and beyond were denied the racial classifi-
cation of “white” and the rights that attended it. Lightness in skin color 
was not sufficient in a claim for whiteness.40 These laws sought to express 
that multiple generations of white forebearers could not cure the stain of 
African ancestry in the United States.41
Accounting for the legalized cruelties and humiliations inflicted on
Black people, the incentives to pass as white were not insignificant.42
Passing for white could relieve an individual from the legal, social, eco-
nomic, and even health burdens associated with being Black. Famously, 
after a near-fatal car accident where he suffered the loss of an eye, the 
famed entertainer, Sammy Davis, Jr. was treated at the San Bernardino 




36. Based on Louisiana law, Ms. Phipps arguably met the perverse racial caste status of 
“octaicosahectaroon” (1/128th Black).
37. Having a status of Black based on one Black parent.
38. Having the status of Black based on one Black grandparent.
39. Having the status of Black based on one Black great grandparent.
40. This exposes not only the rigid complexities of white supremacy, but also con-
founding ironies.
41. As a pragmatic matter, absent a genealogical search, someone like Ms. Phipps 
could “pass” or live as white so long as she or he did not draw suspicion.
42. Historically, passing refers to Black individuals significantly fair in complexion to 
successfully live or work as white. See, e.g., ALLYSON HOBBS, A CHOSEN EXILE: A
HISTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014).
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County Hospital; it was the only hospital that would admit Black people 
when more elite medical centers would not. Neither his fame or wealth, 
or amiability allowed him to transcend the racial caste system.
If “passing” were an option, lawmakers cleverly constructed disin-
centives to dissuade attempts to breach the colorline. For example, living 
fraudulently as a white person, or deceiving someone about being white 
could result in legal punishment or penalty. In the sobering divorce case, 
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander,43 Leonard “Kip” Rhinelander, son of a 
wealthy, socially elite, New York family, was pressured by his parents to 
annul his marriage to Alice Jones, a “light” complected chambermaid and 
mixed-race Black woman. Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig provides a 
detailed account of this important case, including the strategies deployed 
by both the plaintiff Leonard, and his wife as the defendant.44 Leonard’s 
lawyers argued that Kip was unaware of Alice’s racial status, even though 
he had lived with her family, engaged in sexual intercourse with her prior 
to their marriage, and later consummated the marriage.45
Had Alice committed fraud against Kip Rhinelander by deceiving him of her 
racial identity? If she had, Kip would be entitled to an annulment of the 
marriage. To answer this question, the court ordered Mrs. Rhinelander 
to disrobe in front of the all-white male jury and judge.46
The defendant . . . then withdrew to the lavatory adjoining 
the jury room and, after a short time, again entered the jury 
room. The defendant, who was weeping, had on her under-
wear and a long coat. At Mr. Davis’ direction she let down 
the coat, so that the upper portion of her body, as far down as 
the breast, was exposed. She then, again at Mr. Davis’ direc-
tion, covered the upper part of her body and showed to the 
jury her bare legs, up as far as her knees. The Court, counsel, 
the jury and the plaintiff then re-entered the court room.47
Following this, Alice’s lawyer asked Leonard, whether his wife’s body “is 
the same shade as when you saw her in the Marie Antoinette with all of 
her clothing removed?”48
43. Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 219 A.D. 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927).
44. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander
As a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage and Family, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2393 (2007).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2429.
47. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 696, Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 219 A.D. 
189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927)). See also, ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO 
OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL 
FAMILY (2013).
48. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 44, at 2429.
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Ultimately, Leonard’s attempt to annul the marriage failed, precisely 
because he had not been deceived, the jury found her racial identity to be 
obvious by the color of her breasts and legs.49 Even while the case was 
hailed in the Black press as a victory for Alice,50 it nevertheless was a 
powerful reminder of racial caste and the legal risks associated with 
breaching the boundaries of race, even in New York. As one could not 
exit the racial subordinate status of being Black, a person of any African 
ancestry could never—save fraud—claim whiteness and access the rights 
and privileges associated with that status. This was race segregation based 
not on housing, education, or employment, but one’s DNA.
C. Anti-miscegenation Laws
A third set of laws whereby lawmakers sought to “degrade the social 
and political status of African Americans and support white supremacy,”
can be found in anti-miscegenation laws.51 By criminalizing and other-
wise prohibiting interracial marriage, such as barring the distribution of 
marriage licenses or the solemnization of such unions, legislatures further 
fortified the racial caste system. Anti-miscegenation laws were broad in 
scope. In Virginia, it was illegal to leave the state to marry; it was a felony 
“if any white person intermarry with a colored person”; and a state pro-
vision voided “all marriages between ‘a white person and a colored per-
son’ without any judicial proceeding.”52 Like matrilineality and hypo-
descent laws, these provisions responded to nativist fears associate with 
“blurred . . . . lines between what many [whites] understood to be a nat-
urally superior white race and a naturally inferior black race.”53 According 
to Carlos A. Ball, “[a]s long as there was a clear distinction between the 
two racial categories—in other words, as long as the two categories could 
49. Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 219 A.D. 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927).
50. See, e.g., Rising Above Prejudice, NEW YORK AMSTERDAM NEWS, Dec. 9, 1925, at 
16 (“jurors have rendered a great service to womanhood in general and Negro woman-
hood in particular”).
51. See, e.g., Amber D. Moulton, Closing the “Floodgate of Impurity”: Moral Reform, 
Antislavery, and Interracial Marriage in Antebellum Massachusetts, 3 J. CIVIL WAR ERA 2
(2013); see also, Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial Un-
ions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2733 (2008) (explaining “[i]t is 
not possible, in other words, to understand fully the historical roots and purposes of anti-
miscegenation laws without an assessment of the role that concerns related to interracial 
children played in their enactment and enforcement.”); See Karen Woods Weierman, 
“For the Better Government of Servants and Slaves”: The Law of Slavery and Miscegenation, 24 
Legal Stud. F. 133, 134 (2000) (explaining how race and sex were treated as intercon-
nected and interdependent concerns).
52. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1967).
53. Ball, supra note 51, at 2734.
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be thought to be mutually exclusive—then the hierarchical racial regimes 
represented first by slavery, and later by legal segregation, could be more 
effectively defended.”54
Often lawmakers defended the necessity and urgency to adopt such 
laws in religious terms and on the basis of preserving moral order. In-
deed, courts upheld such laws on that basis.55 As the Supreme Court took 
notice in Loving v. Virginia, the trial judge that convicted and sentenced 
Mildred Jeter, a Black woman and Richard, a white man, for violating 
Virginia’s “Racial Integrity Act of 1924,” which was enacted during a 
“period of extreme nativism . . . . follow[ing] the end of the First World 
War.”56
At their sentencing for violating the Virginia statutes barring inter-
racial marriage, the trial court expressed:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay 
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but 
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no 
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races 
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.57
In this case, police raided the couple’s home, while they were sleep-
ing, and arrested Mildred, who was pregnant at the time, incarcerating 
her for several days. The couple was legally married in Washington, 
D.C., and they displayed their marriage certificate in their home. Never-
theless, a local grand jury issued an indictment “charging the Lovings 
with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages,” and weeks later 
the couple “pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year 
in jail.”58 The sentencing judge suspended their sentence for a “period of 
25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return 
to Virginia together for 25 years.”59
Four years later, in 1964, the Lovings filed motions to vacate the 
judgment and to have the opinion set aside on the basis that the Virginia 
law violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A state trial judge denied their 
motions. The couple faced a cruel ultimatum: live outside of the state in 
marital union but away from their families, or return as a couple, risking 
incarceration and the state ignoring their marital union. Their fate as a 
couple was further complicated by the fact that Virginia was not the only 
54. Id.
55. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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state to ban or refuse to recognize interracial marriages. The couple ap-
pealed once more. Thereafter, the state’s highest court, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals, “upheld the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation 
statutes” affirmed their convictions and modified their sentences.60
The Lovings successfully petitioned their case to the United States 
Supreme Court, arguing the Virginia law violated both equal protection 
under the law and substantive due process.61 At the time of their litigation 
in 1967, sixteen states prohibited and punished “marriages on the basis of 
racial classification.”62 Among the arguments put forth by Virginia to de-
fend its racial purity law, including “that the state’s legitimate purposes 
were ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens’ and to prevent ‘the 
corruption of blood,’ . . . . [and] ‘the obliteration of racial pride,’” was 
that the law applied equally to both the white husband and Black wife.63
Citing McLaughlin v State of Florida,64 Virginia argued that “the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause . . . is only that state penal laws 
containing interracial element as a part of the definition of the offense 
must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of 
each race are punished to the same degree.”65 This legal strategy stretched 
the meaning of the Court’s rulings in Railway Express Agency66 (involving 
a statute “discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be 
displayed on trucks in New York City”)67 and Allied Stores of Ohio,68 (ad-
dressing “an exemption in Ohio’s ad valorem tax for merchandise owned 
by a non-resident in a storage warehouse”).69 Neither case involved racial 
discrimination laws. Handing down its landmark decision, striking down 
the Virginia laws and by extension all others that proscribed interracial 
marriage, the Court stated:
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry 
solely because of racial classifications violates the central mean-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause. These statutes also deprive 
the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 7.
64. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967).
66. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
67. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
68. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
69. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
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vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.70
Many, though not all, anti-miscegenation laws were enacted after 
the abolition of slavery just as confederate monuments were erected 
across the United States as symbols of white supremacy and to protect the 
racial order during Jim Crow.71 Anti-miscegenation or “anti-
amalgamation” laws predating slavery’s abolition, were consistent with 
proslavery policies within states. States in the North as well as the South 
adopted such laws. Neither slavery nor the racial caste system were geo-
graphically confined to southern states. To the contrary, just as slavery 
was operational in northern territories and states, including New York,72
Connecticut, 73 and Pennsylvania,74 so too were laws denying interracial 
marriages.75
Northerners “were not unmindful of the danger racial equality 
posed to national union” as well as the importance of maintaining slav-
ery.76 For example, in 1705, colonial lawmakers in Massachusetts enacted 
an anti-miscegenation law based significantly on Virginia’s existing law.77
As in Virginia, there, “the development of miscegenation law was direct-
ly related to the growth of slavery.”78 In fact, “Massachusetts was also the 
first colony explicitly to authorize slavery by law.”79
And, “[u]ntil February 1843, when the state legislature repealed a 
statute that banned marriages between whites and ‘Negroes, Indians, or 
70. Id. at 12.
71. Kathy Eyre, Mississippi Still Far From Accepting Interracial Marriage, AP NEWS (Nov. 
28, 1987), https://apnews.com/article/d57930264fd39578c14f3f64f2cec4e8#:~:text=
Mississippi%20voters%20repealed%20by%20a,3; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-104 (1947), re-
printed in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 44 (Pauli Murray ed., 1950); DEL. CODE
ch. 85, § 3485 (1935), reprinted in id. at 52; KY. REV. STAT. § 391.110 (1948), reprinted in
id. at 168; LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (1947), reprinted in id. at 190; MD. CODE art. 27, § 445 
(1939), reprinted in id. at 207-08; TEX. PEN. CODE, art. 492 (1947), reprinted in id. at 452; 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4697 (1943), reprinted in id. at 511.
72. Adele Oltman, The Hidden History of Slavery In New York, NATION (Oct. 24, 
2005), https://www.thenation.com/article/hidden-history-slavery-new-york/.
73. EDGAR J. MCMANUS, BLACK BONDAGE IN THE NORTH 169-70 (1973) (“Con-
necticut’s lawmakers were extremely cautious about moving against slavery. Negroes 
were more numerous in the state than in the rest of New England combined, and racial 
anxieties were correspondingly more acute.”).
74. GARY B. NASH & JEAN R. SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION 
IN PENNSYLVANIA AND ITS AFTERMATH 55 (1991).
75. See, e.g., Moulton, supra note 51, at 5-7.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Weierman, supra note 51, at 146.
78. Id. at 144.
79. Id. at 145.
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Mulattos,’ interracial couples in Massachusetts found their unions de-
clared null and void, their children were classed as illegitimate, and any 
official who solemnized an interracial union could be fined.”80 Despite 
the law’s repeal, interracial intimacy remained unsettled in Massachusetts.
In 1913, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a law that prevented cou-
ples from a marriage safe harbor or sanctuary in their state if denied a 
marriage license elsewhere.81 In essence, after the repeal of the Massachu-
setts anti-miscegenation law, only interracial couples who were citizens 
of that state could marry there.
Rhode Island,82 Maine,83 Illinois,84 Iowa,85 Kansas,86 Maine,87 Michi-
gan,88 Pennsylvania,89 and Ohio90 are among the northern states that en-
acted laws banning interracial marriage. Six states found interracial mar-
riage so abhorrent that they ratified their constitutions to bar such 
unions.91 These states included Alabama,92 Florida,93 Mississippi,94 North 
Carolina,95 South Carolina,96 and Tennessee.97 And, though the Supreme 
80. See e.g., Moulton, supra note 51, at 2.
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (1913); Zebulon Miletsky, The Dilemma of Interra-
cial Marriage: The Boston NAACP and the National Equal Rights League, 1912-1927, 44 
HISTORICAL J. MASS. 137, 140 (2016); AMBER D. MOULTON, THE FIGHT FOR 
INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM MASSACHUSETTS (2015).
82. Act of Mar. 23, 1881, 1881 R.I. Pub. Laws 108 (repealing ban on interracial mar-
riage).
83. Act of Mar. 12, 1883, 1883 Me. Laws 167 (repealing ban on interracial marriage).
84. Act of Jan. 17, 1829, 1832 Ill. Laws 465 (banning interracial marriage).
85. Act of Jan. 6, 1840, 1839 Iowa Acts 42 (banning interracial marriage).
86. Compare 1855 Kan. Sess. Laws c. 108 § 3 (banning interracial marriage), with 1857 
Kan. Sess. Laws c. 49 (omitting language banning interracial marriages).
87. Act of Mar. 12, 1883, 1883 Me. Laws 167 (repealing ban on interracial marriage).
88. 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 16, reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra 
note 71, at 407 230 (amending an 1871 statute to validate interracial marriage contracts).
89. 1725 Pa. Laws 145 (prohibiting ministers from approving interracial marriages).
90. 1861 Ohio Laws 6 (prohibiting interracial marriage).
91. James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE B.J. 26, 
31 (1951).
92. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102 (annulled 2000); Ala. Code tit. 14, § 360 (1958), re-
printed in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 71, at 246.
93. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 24, reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR,
supra note 71, at 77; FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (1941), reprinted in id. at 83.
94. MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263 (repealed 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942), 
reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 71, at 246; Eyre, supra note 
71.
95. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 8, reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, su-
pra note 71, at 329; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1953) (repealed 1973).
96. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 33 (repealed 1999), reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE 
AND COLOR, supra note 71, at 407; S.C. CODE § 8571 (1942), reprinted in id. at 417.
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Court’s ruling in Loving v. Virginia ultimately struck down all such laws, 
effectively making it legal to marry someone of a different race, states 
continued to delay repealing statutes and constitutional amendments ban-
ning interracial marriage. It was only in 1987 that “Mississippi voters re-
pealed by a narrow 52 percent to 48 percent margin the state’s 1890 con-
stitutional ban on interracial marriage.”98 As stunning as that may seem, 
“Mississippi didn’t grant its first marriage license to an interracial couple 
until 1970, under a federal judge’s order.”99
One matter in common among all the states that banned interracial 
marriages is that they all prohibited “Negro-white marriages.”100 Some 
states barred Asian-white unions101 and still others banned Indigenous-
white unions.102 Commonly, geography dictated these laws.103 No state 
barred interracial marriages and excluded Black-white marriages from 
their discriminatory policies.
That forty-one states prohibited interracial marriage at one point in 
time gives a sense of the scope and scale of states’ efforts to proscribe in-
terracial marriage and preserve white racial purity. The broad enactment 
of anti-miscegenation legislation expressed the accepted view that main-
taining the primacy and purity of whiteness necessitated a collective ef-
fort. It required mass compliance and comprehensive adherence to main-
tain the herd immunity of whiteness. As such, more than law mattered. 
Social compliance and adherence mattered. Even while hypodescent leg-
islation provided a sturdy buffer against Black people exiting their status, 
anti-miscegenation laws spoke explicitly of the stunning contempt in 
which Black people were held.
97. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (repealed 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8409 (1934), 
reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 71, at 438.
98. Eyre, supra note 71.
99. Id.
100. Browning, supra note 91, at 31.
101. See, e.g., Deenesh Sohoni, Unsuitable Suitors: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Naturaliza-
tion Laws, and the Construction of Asian Identities, 41 L. & SOC’Y R. 587, 587 (2007) (ex-
plaining that in 1861, “Nevada became the first state to pass a law specifically barring 
marriages between whites and Asians. Over the course of the next century, until the 1967 
Supreme Court decision Loving v. Virginia declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitu-
tional, an additional 14 states came to ban marriages between whites and Asians.”).
102. Browning, supra note 91, at 31.
103. Sohoni, supra note 101, at 587 (explaining that “[t]he first states to pass anti-
miscegenation statutes against Asians were located primarily in the West, but over the 
next hundred years states in the Midwest, South, and East also enacted such laws.”).
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D.  Eugenics
The guarding of racial purity intensified during post-
Reconstruction in the United States, so much so that it began to impact 
whether white Americans were permitted to control their reproduction 
intra-racially. In 1927, more than twenty years after the first eugenics law 
was enacted in Indiana, the United States Supreme Court issued the 
landmark decision of Buck v. Bell, upholding the constitutionality of Vir-
ginia’s Eugenical Sterilization Act.104 In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled 
the constitutional authority to impose vaccine mandates is broad enough 
to compel the forced sterilization of women and men deemed socially 
unfit.105 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes issued a 
haunting condemnation of vulnerable white women, declaring “three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”106
The case centered on Carrie Buck, whom Justice Holmes described 
as “a feeble-minded white woman.”107 He claimed that she was the 
“daughter of a feeble-minded mother”108 and “the mother of an illegiti-
mate feeble-minded child.”109 Notwithstanding the inaccuracies of these 
statements, even if they were true, should the state possess such authority as to 
dictate who should be able to parent?
The state presented evidence that the Court found persuasive. One 
evaluation of Carrie’s “fitness” came from Harry H. Laughlin, who, alt-
hough not a physician (and though he never examined her),110 was a dis-
tinguished leader in the eugenics movement, serving as superintendent of 
the Eugenics Record Office of the Department of Genetics at the Carne-
gie Institute and the “eugenics expert” to various congressional commit-
tees, including the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.111
104. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
105. See id. (upholding a Virginia law which required the sterilization of incompetent 
persons). Carrie Buck, a victim of rape at age sixteen, bore a child out of wedlock. The 
state of Virginia claimed that Buck possessed low social character and intelligence; it pre-
dicted that were she to have more children they would be born of inferior intelligence. 
She and others like her were collected by public health officials to be sterilized. However, 
years after the case, Holmes and public health officials in Virginia were proven wrong, 
Buck’s daughter, Vivian, was a successful student—well above average.
106. Buck, 274 US at 207.
107. Id. at 205.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 51 (1985).
111. Harry H. Laughlin, PICKLER MEM’L LIBR., TRUMAN STATE UNIV.,
http://library.truman.edu/manuscripts/laughlinbio.asp [https://perma.cc/LC57-Y224] 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
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In Carrie Buck’s case, her poverty, perceived intellectual shortcom-
ings, teenage pregnancy (the result of a rape), and family history of alco-
holism were invoked to justify the state’s reprisal and her sterilization.112
The Court found:
It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already 
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not 
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our 
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the 
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for 
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind.113
In the wake of the Supreme Court declaring the Virginia eugenics 
law constitutional, more than sixty thousand Americans were convicted 
of social unfitness and surrendered to public health officials for compulso-
ry sterilizations.114 Eugenics further guarded white racial purity, by polic-
ing and restricting undesirable white people from “continuing their 
kind.”115 Compulsory sterilization laws reflected the cruel and inhumane 
lengths to which white elites dared go in order to refine and preserve 
whiteness.
After all, at the heart of eugenics laws was a political and legal 
commitment to surveillance, government intrusion, reprisal, and retribu-
tion to discourage not only vice, but also sex, single parenting, and re-
production among the socially undesirable. At their core, these policies 
were rooted in social judgments about the poor and served to further 
shape social and legal understandings about whiteness.
Conclusion:
To understand racial ordering in the United States, one should 
begin by the examining the law and studying closely of judicial opinions, 
legislation, and legal ordinances. That is, rather than considering racist 
law some strange anomaly, one should understand that racial caste and 
112. See, e.g., NPR’s Hidden Brain and Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 
CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 332 (1985), https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle
/11299/164572/02_02_Gould.pdf.
113. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (1927) (ruling “the principle that sustains compulsory vac-
cination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes”).
114. Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2011, at A1.
115. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (1927) at 207.
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ordering in the United States were purposefully created and maintained 
by law and legal institutions. Indeed, slavery itself was not only an eco-
nomic institution, but also one of law.
Importantly, the creation of racial caste in the United States was 
achieved through the regulation of women’s bodies and sex. Legislation 
governing matrilineality, laws related to hypodescent, bans on interracial 
marriage, and eugenics—namely the forced sterilization of people viewed 
as unfit for the American ideal reinforced caste and racial hierarchies. The 
results were not only peculiar—such as hypodescent laws—but also cruel.
Today, the endurance of racial caste could not be maintained with-
out the structures and forces of law. Vertical, racial hierarchies reshaped 
law such that it reduced the impact of Reconstruction Amendments for 
more than a century, sadly, rendering them virtually meaningless, replac-
ing equal protection with “separate but equal” and voting rights with ex-
panded, dubious requirements and restrictions. Even the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s abolition of slavery is punctuated by a Punishment Clause, 
which legalizes slavery in the United States so long as an individual has 
been convicted of a crime. The Punishment Clause provided the founda-
tion on which southerners committed to slavery could and did expand 
coerced labor. It has yet to be repealed.

